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FAIR USE IN THE UNITED STATES: TRANSFORMED,
DEFORMED, REFORMED?

JANE C GINSBURG*

Since the United States Supreme Court's 1994 adoption of "transformative use" as a criterion for
evaluating the first statutory fair use factor, "transformative use" analysis has engulfed all of fair
use, becoming transformed, and perhaps deformed, in the process. A finding of"transformativeness"
often foreordained the ultimate outcome, as the remaining factors, especially the fourth, withered
into restatements of the first.
Lately, however, courts are expressing greater scepticism concerning what uses actually "transform" the original content. As a result, courts may be reforming "transformative use" to reinvigorate
the other statutory factors, particularly the inquiry into the impact of the use on the potential markets
for or value of the copied work. The article concludes with some suggestions for rebalancing the
factors.

I. INTRODUCTION

&

The United States ("US") Copyright Act of 19761 codifies the "fair use" doctrine
developed by the American courts from the middle of the 19 'h century. It is the
most general exception in US copyright law. Judicious balancing of its four statutory factors assists the happy cohabitation of private rights in works of authorship
with public rights of free expression. 2 It also has tempered claims of copyright
infringement in order to foster technological innovation. Many lay the credit-and
some, the blame-for the recent expansion of fair use to favour increasingly parasitic
new works and aggressively copyright-dependent new business models on the US
Supreme Court's 1994 adoption of "transformative use" as a criterion for evaluating the first statutory fair use factor. As the previous EW Barker Centre for Law
Business Distinguished Visitor in Intellectual Property, Barton Beebe, has observed

2

Morton L Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, School ofLaw, Columbia University.
Thanks to Shyamkrishna Balganesh, June Besek, David Lindsay, David Louk, Tim Wu, and for research
assistance to Anna Iskikian and Brandon Zamudio, both Columbia Law School class of 2020. Professor
Jane Ginsburg delivered the second EW Barker Centre for Law & Business Distinguished Visitor in
Intellectual Property Lecture at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore on 12 November
2019. This article is based upon that lecture.
Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (codified as amended in 17 USC).
See eg, Harper & Row v Nation Enters, 471 US 539 at 558 (1985) (copyright is the "engine of free
expression"); Eldredv Ashcroft, 537 US 186 at 219 (2003); Golan v Holder, 565 US 302 at 328 (2012).
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(albeit not in last year's lecture), since the US Supreme Court's 1994 adoption of
"transformative use" as a criterion for evaluating the first statutory fair use factor
("nature and purpose of the use"), the "transformative use" analysis has engulfed all
of fair use, becoming transformed, and perhaps deformed, in the process. 3 A finding
of "transformativeness" often foreordained the ultimate outcome, as the remaining
factors, especially the fourth (impact of the use on the market for or value of the copied
work), withered into restatements of the first. Initially deployed to assess whether
the challenged use resulted in a work that transformed the copied material with "new
expression, meaning, or message", 4 transformative use evolved into transformative
purpose, enabling a variety of technological fair uses that copied entire works without accompanying commentary, criticism or other substantive intervention in the
work's content. Moreover, because fair use is "not an infringement of copyright", 5
none of these technological fair uses, however profit-making, required any payment
to the authors and copyright owners whose works served as "raw material". 6
Lately, however, the fair use pendulum's outward swing may have arrested, as
courts express greater scepticism concerning what uses actually "transform" content
copied into new works or repurposed into copyright-voracious systems. As a result,
in both new work and new purpose cases, courts may be reforming "transformative use" to reinvigorate the other statutory factors, particularly the inquiry into the
impact of the use on the potential markets for or value of the copied work. The
restored prominence of the fourth factor should also occasion renewed reflection on
its meaning. As digital media bring to the fore new or previously under-examined
kinds of harm, courts will need not only to continue to refine their appreciation of
a work's markets, but also to expand their analyses beyond the traditional inquiry,
ie, whether the challenged use substitutes for an actual or potential market for the
work. Courts should acknowledge that the statute's designation of "the value of the
copyrighted work" identifies an independent kind of harm, and entails considerations distinct from market substitution. Those include creators' economic and moral
interests in being recognised as the authors of the copied works.
This article will examine the flow and eddy of the US fair use trajectory, and
will consider whether the US experience might offer useful guidance (or cautionary
tales) to other jurisdictions, notably Singapore, which are considering adopting or
expanding fair use-type copyright exceptions.

3

4

5
6

See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of US Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156
U Pennsylvania L Rev 549 (2008). For a more recent empirical study, see Jairui Liu, "An Empirical
Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law" (2019) 22 Stan Tech L Rev 163.
See Campbell v Acuff-Rose, 510 US 569 at 579 (1994) [Campbell] (citing Pierre Leval, "Toward a Fair
Use Standard" (1990) 103 Harv L Rev 1105).
17 USC, supra note 1, § 107.
See Seltzer v Green Day, Inc, 725 F 3d 1170 at 1176 (9th Cir 2013) (finding a "transformative purpose"
where defendant "used [the plaintiff's illustration] as 'raw material' in the construction of [a] four-minute
video backdrop"); Bill Graham Archives, LLC v Dorling Kindersley Ltd, 386 F Supp 2d 324 at 330
(SDNY 2005) (finding a "transformative purpose" in defendant's reproduction of seven copyrighted
images in their entirety). See also Authors Guild v Google, Inc, 804 F 3d 202 at 216, 217 (2015)
[Google Books] (finding "a highly transformative purpose" in Google's digitisation of entire books for
the purpose of enabling a search function); Authors Guild v HathiTrust, 755 F 3d 87 at 98 (2d Cir 2014)
[HathiTrust (2d Cir)].
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II. FROM TRANSFORMATIVE WORK, TO TRANSFORMATIVE PURPOSE

A. General Observations
First, a few general comments about fair use in the US. Section 107 of the US
CopyrightAct of 1976 codifies the "fair use" doctrine developed by the American
courts from the middle of the 19' century. 7 If applicable, this exception makes
unconsented copying from prior works "non-infringing" and thus does not give
rise to any payment. Section 107 contains a preamble listing several kinds of uses,
notably for criticism, comment, news reporting and teaching, but these examples do
not delimit the universe of permitted uses. In fact, the preamble gives a general idea
of the scope of the exception (in particular, most, but not all, of the examples concern
the inclusion of the copied material in a new work made by the person who carried out
the partial copying from an earlier work). Unlike "closed list" systems of copyright
exceptions, 8 or most "fair dealing" exceptions in Commonwealth countries, a use's
absence from the list does not prevent it from being covered by fair use. Moreover,
a use's inclusion on the list does not in itself lead to the conclusion that the use will
be considered non-infringing.
On the contrary, the law sets out four non-exhaustive factors "to be considered"
by the courts:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
the nature of the copyrighted work;
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.9

)

These broad, supple, indeed manipulable, criteria afford considerable flexibility in
the assessment of fair use. This flexibility has enabled the exception to adapt to
new means of expression and communication of works, but gives it at times an
unpredictable character. 10 Initially, when codified in 1976, the fair use exception
applied primarily to the partial reproduction of material from a first work that the
second author reworked into his or her own work (so-called "productive use" 11
without harming the current or future exploitation of the first work. However, as

8

9
10
1

The decision commonly considered to be the origin of the US fair use doctrine is Folsom v Marsh, 9 F
Cas 342 at 348 (CCD Mass 1841) (No 4,901). But antecedents, in the form of the "fair abridgement"
doctrine, trace back to late 18 th century English decisions. See generally, Matthew Sag, "The Prehistory
of Fair Use" (2011) 76 Brooklyn L Rev 1371.
See eg, Directives EC, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, 2001 OJ (L 167) at 10.
17 USC, supra note 1, § 07.
See eg, Monge v Maya Magazines, Inc, 688 F 3d 1164 at 1171 (9th Cir 2012).
See Universal City Studios, Inc v Sony Corp ofAmerica, 659 F 2d 963 at 970 (9th Cir 1981), rev'd
464 US 417 (1984) [Universal City Studios]: "[a] second author may not copy something to make the
intrinsic, ordinary use out of it, but may copy for so-called 'productive use'." See also Dow Jones
Co, Inc v Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 546 F Supp 113 at 119 (SDNY 1982).
&

7
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early as in 1984, the US Supreme Court in Sony Corp of America v Universal City
Studios, Inc 12 (known as the "Betamax" case) held, in the absence of a statutory
exception for private copying, that a consumer's making for time-shifting purposes
a copy of a full television program broadcast free of charge on the public airwaves
was not a commercial use and did not harm the televised work's market and was
thus fair use. Therefore, the Court deemphasised the non-productive character of
the use 1 3 and stressed instead the purported non-commercial context of the use.
The Supreme Court thus opened the way for an extension beyond creative reuses of
content to technological access-enhancing uses and, as we shall see, the lower courts
have increasingly taken this path.
The Supreme Court's subsequent case law has evolved, reducing the weight that
it had placed on the commercial nature of the use (deemed to be almost decisive in
Sony) and on its impact on the market, and instead stressing the "transformative"
character of the use. In its 1994 decision in Campbell1 4 concerning a music parody
released on commercial records, the Court provided a gloss to the first criterion
by extending the benefit of the exception to a use that "adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message". 15 It is worth citing more fully the reasoning of the Court because later
decisions from the lower courts evidence a shift towards a much broader concept
of the "transformative" character of the use. Specifically, they have moved from
seeking a "transformative work" to divining a "transformative purpose"; the latter
does not imply the creation of a new work. But initially, the "transformation" as
expounded by the Supreme Court, resulted from uses that produced new works that
gave the copied portions "new expression, meaning or message". 16
According to the Court's reasoning, the greater the extent of the transformation,
the smaller the significance of the commercial character of the use. The more transformative the use is, the less it will compete with the current or future exploitation
of the work (at least, that is what the judges assumed). In Campbell, the new work
was a parody and the Court stressed that authors should not be able to control the
market for works that criticised theirs. 17 The Supreme Court's analysis nonetheless
sowed the seeds for the subsequent conflation of the remaining fair use factors into
the first. Later decisions came to conclude that if the use was "transformative", then
the market within which it operated was also "transformative", and, accordingly,
non-competing. 18
B. Transformative Works
Let us consider how "transformative use" analysis appeared to convert the statutory
four-factor test into a one-factor inquiry. We can best trace the trajectory through a
12

15

464 US 417 (1984).
Ibid at 684.
Supra note 4.
Ibid at 579.

16

Ibid.

17

Ibid at 592: "there is no protectable derivative market for criticism".

18

See eg, HathiTrust (2d Cir), supra note 6 at 99: "under Factor Four, any economic 'harm' caused by
transformative uses does not count because such uses, by definition, do not serve as substitutes for the
original work".

13
14
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series of appropriation art cases, decided primarily in the Second Circuit. The works
subject to takings that allegedly changed their meaning, often with little manipulation
of the content, were mainly photographic and pictorial. Initially, before the decision
in Campbell, the courts showed a rather hostile attitude towards these appropriations, which they viewed as unjustified free-riding. Rogers v Koons, 19 for example,
involved a black-and-white photo of a couple with a litter of puppies; artist Jeff Koons
adapted the image into a brightly coloured sculpture entitled "String of Puppies". See
the photos below.

Photo: Art Rogers

Jeff Koons, String of Puppies
19

960 F 2d 301 (2d Cir 1992) [Rogers v Koons].
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected Koons' claim that the sculpture
was a parody of the banality of the life of Americans living in affluent suburbs; if
Koons' aim was to mock society at large, it was not necessary to copy the plaintiff's
particular work. Moreover, the plaintiff's work was too unknown to be the object of
a parody (familiarity with the target of the joke being an implicit condition). By way
of general condemnation, the court observed:
Here, the essence of Rogers' photograph was copied nearly in toto, much more
than would have been necessary even if the sculpture had been a parody of the
plaintiff's work. In short, it is not really the parody flag that appellants are sailing
under, but rather the flag of piracy.20
Subsequently, after Campbell, the same Court of Appeals softened its stance, so
much so that its decisions seem to amount to an unavowed U-turn. In another case
involving Jeff Koons and a photographer, the plaintiff photographer claimed that
Koons had copied the most important part of one of her fashion photos and used
it in a work entitled "Niagara" consisting of a collage of several photos combining
images of women's legs and bare or shod feet (including the photo at issue) with
images of fast food and Niagara Falls. 21 See the photos below.

Andrea Blanch, Silk Sandals by Gucci (published in Allure, August 2000)

20
21

Ibid at 311.
Blanch v Koons, 467 F 3d 244 at 247, 248 (2d Cir 2006) [Blanch].
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Jeff Koons, Niagara (2000)

This time, the Court accepted the fair use defence, explaining that Koons' use was
"transformative", as the copied work served as "raw material" for an entirely different
message from the one conveyed by the photographer. 22 The Court credited Koons'
description of his artistic approach. 23
Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch's image as fodder for
his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. His stated
objective is thus not to repackage Blanch's "Silk Sandals", but to employ it "in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings". 24
When, as here, the copyrighted work is used as "raw material", in the furtherance of
distinct creative or communicative objectives, the use is transformative. 25
In a concurring opinion, one of the judges distinguished Rogers v Koons by pointing out that, in the earlier case, Koons' behaviour was parasitic while the juxtaposition
of the images in this case was for the purpose of commentary. 26 Indeed, it is possible
to reconcile the two decisions by observing that, in the first case, Koons used the
whole photo and, apart from transforming the image into a three-dimensional work,
added little independent input, while, in the second case, the copying was partial and
was incorporated into a far more complex second work. In addition, the opinion of
the Court and the concurring opinion both stress that where Rogers had suffered harm
because Koons had usurped his market for licensing reproductions or adaptations of
his photos, Koons did not encroach on any market exploited by Blanch because she
admitted that she did not grant licenses to reuse her photos. In considering whether
Blanch had suffered harm, the Court declined to take account of potential secondary

22

25

Ibid at 253.
Ibid at 252, 253.
Ibid at 253.
Ibid.

26

Ibid at 262 (Katzmann, J, concurring).

23

24
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markets that similarly situated photographers might have exploited even if Blanch
herself had not. 27
More recently, the same Court of Appeals applied the fair use exception in favour
of another appropriation artist, Richard Prince, who had copied and reworked (to
varying degrees) several photos from Yes, Rasta,28 a book that photojournalist Patrick
Cariou had published on Jamaican Rastafarians. Prince created a series of 35 paintings, titled Canal Zone, in which he enlarged images from Yes, Rasta tenfold and
transferred them to canvases, sometimes superimposing colours or other elements on
the otherwise unchanged images and sometimes incorporating the image in a collage
with other images taken from Cariou's book or from other sources. See some of the
photos below.

Top photos: Patrick Cariou, Yes, Rasta; bottom photos, Richard Prince, Canal Zone
Prince asserted fair use, but given his refusal to explain to the District Court what
new meaning or new message he was conveying by using Cariou's works, the court
denied the alleged transformative character of the use. The Court of Appeals reversed
the initial judgment except for five of the thirty paintings that reused Cariou's photos,
finding in Prince's works a clear transformation of Cariou's photos and dispensing
27

28

Cf Salinger v Colting, 607 F 3d 68 (2d Cir 2010) [Salinger], which considered market harm from an
unauthorised sequel to JD Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye (US: Lb Books, 1991) even though Salinger
had declined to create or authorise sequels.
Patrick Cariou, Yes, Rasta (Brooklyn: powerHouse Books, 2000).
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the artist from any requirement of explicit commentary:
What is critical is how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not
simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of work. Prince's
work could be transformative even without commenting on Cariou's work or on
culture, and even without Prince's stated intention to do so. 2 9
Having found that most of the works at issue were transformative in character, the
Court then considered the harm suffered by the plaintiff (fourth factor). In earlier
decisions, the Court had found market substitution when the publics for the author's
and the infringer's works, or for derivative versions, overlapped. The public for
Prince's works, on the other hand, the Court stated, was totally different from Cariou's. The latter's book was out of print; he had sold only four prints from the book to
acquaintances and his total revenue from Yes, Rasta was $8,000, while Prince exhibited his works in the most exclusive galleries, sold them for over $2,000,000 and had
invited Hollywood stars (such as Robert DeNiro, Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt) and
celebrities from the contemporary art world (including Jeff Koons), to the opening
of Canal Zone. As poor Cariou could never hope to reach the heights that Richard
Prince had achieved, the Court reasoned, it followed that the photographer's and the
artist's markets did not overlap, and that Prince's transformative appropriation did
not harm Cariou's pitiful market.
This decision is hard to reconcile with same court's decision twenty-one years
earlier in Rogers v Koons. The earlier decision might be distinguished on the ground
that it preceded the Supreme Court's adoption of "transformative use", but the more
recent decision leads one to wonder whether it is not an overruling of Rogers v
Koons rather than a coherent development of case law. Nevertheless, although some
aspects of the grounds in Cariou, not least the weight that the Court attached to
the guestlist for the gallery opening, are questionable (if not shocking), the Court's
refusal to require artists to explain themselves is certainly compatible with the free
speech goals that fair use furthers. 30 Artists are not art critics-no more than judges
are 3 1 -and the copyright law should let their works speak for themselves. 32
That said, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's endorsement of using
another artist's works as "raw material" may invite misuse. If a transformative use
exploits a transformative market and hence a market that does not encroach on the
plaintiff's markets, then a court's acceptance of the "transformativeness" of the use
tends to pre-empt the fourth factor. Denominating another artist's work raw material
for the creation of transformative works seems to disregard the first author's exclusive

29
30

31

32

Cariou v Prince, 714 F 3d 694 at 707 (2d Cir 2013) [Cariou].
See Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 at 221 (2003) (referencing "copyright's built-in free speech safeguards"); Golan v Holder, 565 US 302 at 328, 329 (2012) (clarifying that those safeguards are the
idea/expression distinction and the fair use doctrine). See also David Tan, "The Lost Language of the
First Amendment in Copyright Fair Use: A Semiotic Perspective of the "Transformative Use" Doctrine
Twenty-Five Years On" (2016) 26 Fordham IP Media & Ent LJ 311.
See Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co, 188 US 239 at 251, 252 (1903).
Of course, artists remain free to explain the new meanings their uses convey, but a finding of fair use
does not require artists to self-justify.
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right to authorise derivative works, thus problematically expanding fair use. 33 On
the other hand, if the derivative works argument reduces to the plaintiff's claim that
its market consists of licensing its works for other artists to rework, we encounter a
different, but similarly worrisome, problem of circularity. 34
As we will see, courts endeavour to extricate themselves from that bind by discounting the transformativeness of the use in the first place; if the defendant has
insufficiently reworked the plaintiff's creation, the court can comfortably find an
invasion of the plaintiff's markets. 35 Of course, this approach puts courts back
in the position of second-guessing artistic judgments, but unless judges are simply to genuflect before assertions of artistic prerogative, they will have to examine
whether the use in fact "transforms" the copied content, and whether the extent of the
copying necessarily advances the transformative objective, or instead simply adds
embellishment. 36

C. Technological Fair Use and Transformative Purpose
The cases we have considered so far involved a second work that included a second
author's input, even if no commentary on the second author's part accompanied the
first work's incorporation in the second one. By contrast, another trend in the fair use
case law vindicates users who are not authors and whose inputs are not new works
at all but rather a new form of dissemination. Courts came to interpret Campbell's
reference to "something new, with a further purpose" 37 to encompass copying, particularly digital copying, that does not add "new expression", so long as the copying

33

34

35
36

37

See Kienitz v Sconnie Nation, 766 F 3d 756 at 758 (7th Cir 2014) [Kienitz]. For examples of transformative fair uses that arguably usurp derivative work rights, see eg, Seltzer v Green Day, Inc, 725 F 3d 1170
(9th Cir 2013) (ruling transformative and therefore fair use the wholesale incorporation of a pictorial
work into a background video for a Green Day rock concert); Andy Warhol Found v Goldsmith, 382
F Supp 3d 312 (SDNY 2019) (silkscreen print incorporating most of photograph of musical performer
Prince). See also the discussion of Goldsmith below, infra notes 65-70.
See eg, Cambridge Univ Press v Patton, 769 F 3d 1232 at 1278 (11th Cir 2014) [Patton], noting that:
[L]icensing poses a particular threat that the fair use analysis will become circular, and plaintiffs
may not head off a defence of fair use by complaining that every potential licensing opportunity
represents a potential market for purposes of the fourth fair use factor...
See also Swatch Group Mgmt Servs v Bloomberg LP, 756 F 3d 73 at 91 (2d Cir 2014) (finding that
the plaintiff defined its potential market "so narrowly that it beg[an] to partake of circular reasoning");
Princeton Univ Press v MichiganDocument Servs, 99 F 3d 1381 at 1387 (6th Cir 1996) (rejecting the
defendant's characterisation of the plaintiff's fourth factor argument as "circular"); Am Geophysical
Union v Texaco Inc, 60 F 3d 913 at 931 (2d Cir 1994), cert dismissed 516 US 1005 (1995) ("The vice
of circular reasoning arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive against fair use"); Lydia P
Loren, Redefining the MarketFailure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems,
5 J Intellectual Property L 1 at 38-41 (1997) (criticising the argument that "lost" permission fees evince
fourth factor harm).
See eg, Morris v Guetta, 2013 US Dist Lexis 15556 (CD Cal 4 Feb 2013) [Morris].
See eg, Graham v Prince, 265 F Supp 3d 366 (SDNY 2017) [Graham]; Morris, ibid. In cases involving
copying from literary works, courts have been more inclined to inquire whether the defendant took more
than it needed for its transformative purpose. See eg, Warner Bros Ent, Inc v RDR Books, 575 F Supp
2d 513 (SDNY 2008); Castle Rock Ent, Inc v CarolPub Group, Inc, 150 F 3d 132 (2d Cir 1998). See
also Craft v Kobler, 667 F Supp 120 at 129 (SDNY 1987) [Craft] (Leval, J).
Campbell, supra note 4 at 579.
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gives the prior work "new meaning". 38 Fair use cases thus began to drift from 'transformative work' to 'transformative purpose'; in the latter instance, copying of an
entire work, without creating a new work, could be excused, particularly if the court
perceived a sufficient public benefit in the appropriation.
In the initial shift from 'transformative work' to 'transformative purpose' the
defendant had in fact created an independent work of authorship, even though that
work did not significantly alter the copied work. Thus, in Bill Graham Archives v
Dorling Kindersley Lt (which did not concern digital technologies), the Second Circuit held a coffee-table-book biography's reduced-sized complete images of posters
of the legendary rock band The Grateful Dead were "transformative" because the
book used the images of the posters as "historical artifacts" to document the Dead's
concerts, rather than for the posters' original aesthetic purpose. 39 The court distinguished between use of a work to exploit its expression and use of a work as an item of
information. But the documentary/aesthetic distinction also significantly expanded
the application of the fair use exception to new technological uses that did not yield
new works. The search engine practice of permanent storage of works for the purpose
of 'indexing' was an important early digital beneficiary of the 'documentary' or 'new
purpose' brand of transformativeness. 4 0
For example, in Perfect 10 (amended),4 1 a controversy involving a search engine's
"highly transformative" indexing of photographs and display of thumbnail images,
the court applied the aesthetic/documentary distinction to find that the use did not
compete with the plaintiff photographer's market for sales of high-resolution images.
In response to the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's use competed with an
evolving market for paid downloads of thumbnail images onto cellphones, the court
held that the plaintiff had not borne its burden of showing that the market was more
than "hypothetical". 42 Apparently reminded that fair use is an affirmative defence,
and therefore that the defendant bears the burden with respect to market harm, the
court reissued its opinion, acknowledging the placement of the burden, 43 and deleting
the phrase "Perfect 10 has not introduced evidence that Google's thumbnails would
38

39
40
41
42
43

See eg, Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F 3d 811 at 819 (9th Cir 2002) [Kelly]: "[b]y putting a copy of the
photograph in the newspaper, the work was transformed into news, creating a new meaning or purpose
for the work".
Bill Graham Archives v DorlingKindersley Ltd, 448 F 3d 605 at 609, 610 (2d Cir 2006).
See eg, Perfect 10, Inc v Amazon.com, Inc, 508 F 3d 1146 at 1174, 1175 (9th Cir 2007) [Perfect 10
(amended)]; Kelly, supra note 38 at 819, 820.
Ibid at 1158.
Perfect 10, Inc vAmazon.com, Inc, 487 F 3d 701 at 725 (9th Cir 16 May 2007) [Perfect 10 (original)],
amended byPerfect 10 amended, ibid.
See Perfect 10 (original), ibid at 714:
Because Perfect 10 has the burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits, the district
court held that Perfect 10 also had the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of overcoming Google's
fair use defence under 17 USC. § 107... We have not previously ruled on this issue... and we now
agree with the district court's ruling. In order to demonstrate its likely success on the merits, the
moving party must necessarily demonstrate it will overcome defences raised by the non-moving
party.
Compare this with Perfect 10 (amended), ibid at 1158:
Because Perfect 10 has the burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits, the district
court held that Perfect 10 also had the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of overcoming Google's
fair use defence under 17 USC. § 107... This ruling was erroneous. At trial, the defendant in an
infringement action bears the burden of proving fair use.
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harm Perfect 10's existing or potential market for full-size images",44 but leaving its
fair use analysis (including the reference to "the unproven use of Google's thumbnails for cell phone downloads" 45 ) unchanged. The court's finding that the indexing
function was "highly transformative" appears to have driven its diminution of the
significance of market harm. The decision shows that the more "transformative" a
court has found the appropriation, the less likely plaintiff can prevail without proving
harm, but the more "transformative" the appropriation, the more futile endeavours
to show harm may prove.
Other applications of the aesthetic/documentary or expression/information distinction to the inputting of copyrighted works into databases then emerged. In AV
ex rel Vanderhye v iParadigms, LLC, the Fourth Circuit ruled the constitution of
a commercial database of student papers by the "Turn It In" plagiarism detection
services a fair use:

,

" [T]he archiving of plaintiffs' papers was transformative and favoured a finding
of 'fair use.' iParadigms' use of these works was completely unrelated to expressive
content and was instead aimed at detecting and discouraging plagiarism. 46
Thereafter, the Second Circuit in HathiTrust(2d Cir), concerning uses by the University of Michigan library of its holdings, as digitised by Google, found the scanning
and permanent storage of full copies of in-copyright books to further the 'transformative use' of allowing 'data mining' of the contents of the books. 47 Such uses
are non-expressive in two senses: they produce no new expression by the copying
and storage entities, and the 'mining' of the scanned book seeks not to expose its
expression, but rather to extract information. 4 8
In light of this progression, the fair use outcome in Google Books,49 in which a
for-profit corporation scanned millions of in-copyright books and permanently stored
their full contents in its database, may have seemed inevitable, even though Google
Books presented two ultimately non-salient differences with HathiTrust (2d Cir).
While the University of Michigan is a non-profit educational institution, and (apart
from a limited program for the visually impaired) it confined its use of the database
to data mining so that it conveyed none of the scanned works' contents to the public,
Google is not a charitable entity, and its book search program communicated to the
public "snippets"-each generally up to three lines of text-of the books. The court
accorded scant weight to the commercial nature of Google's enterprise, stressing
that the Second Circuit has "repeatedly rejected the contention that commercial
motivation should outweigh a convincing transformative purpose and absence of
significant substitutive competition with the original".5 0 Distinguishing between
outputs that convey information about the scanned book from outputs that convey
its expression, the court ruled that neither the data mining uses nor the snippet
44
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Perfect 10 (amended), ibid at 1158.
Ibid at 1168.
562 F 3d 630 at 640 (4th Cir 2009).
HathiTrust(2d Cir), supra note 6.
See generally the attached Brief of Digital Humanities and Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Partial
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in HathiTrust(2d Cir), ibid, 2012 WL 4808939
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views exploited the copied works for their expressive value. Hence "the creation
of complete digital copies of copyrighted works [results in] transformative fair uses
when the copies 'served a different function from the original' ."51
With respect to the data mining uses that yield little or no copyrighted expression,
there is a powerful argument that exploiting a work for its non-expressive information (bibliographic or bean-counting, ie, how many times and in what works a given
word or phrase appears) is not even prima-facie infringing, and that the digitization
of lawfully possessed copies (loaned from the University of Michigan Library) to
create a database that enables non-expressive, but progress-of-knowledge-enhancing
outputs must therefore be equally free. 52 By contrast, the snippet views did convey
limited amounts of expression, but the court repeatedly emphasised the very constrained and controlled, "fragmentary and scattered", "cumbersome, disjointed, and
incomplete nature of the aggregation of snippets made available through snippet
view".5 3 As a result, and endeavouring to avoid slippery-slope expansion of the
content or presentation of fair use-permissible snippets, the court emphasised that
"at least as presently structuredby Google, the snippet view does not reveal matter
that offers the marketplace a significantly competing substitute for the copyrighted
work". 54
Like Cariou, Google Books may mark the outermost swing of the fair use pendulum.55 As we will see in the next section, courts, particularly appellate courts,
are more critically examining assertions of "transformativeness", and are restoring emphasis on the fourth factor: market harm. But if courts are retreating from the
excesses of "transformative use", re-emphasis of the inquiry into economic harm may
be introducing new distortions, as courts' evaluations of cognisable harm diverge.
III. THE PENDULUM RETURNS?

A. More CriticalAssessments of "Transformativeness" in New Work Cases
Given the trend toward an "if 'transformative', then fair use" formula, 56 it may
not be surprising that the recent retrenchments closely scrutinised the allegedly
transformative character of the use, whether with respect to new works or to new
51
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Cf Sega Ents v Accolade, Inc, 977 F 2d 1510 (9th Cir 1992) (holding that the creation of a verbatim
intermediate copy in order to produce a non-infringing complementary program is fair use, where the
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Google Books, supra note 6 at 223, 224.
Ibid at 222 [emphasis added].
See TCA Corp v McCollum, 839 F 3d 168 at 181 (2d Cir 2016) [McCollum] (calling Cation, supra
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B Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (New York: Matthew Bender Elite Products) vol 4
at § 13.05[B][6], stating with respect to Cariou, supra note 29:
It would seem that the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of recognizing any alteration as
transformative, such that this doctrine now threatens to swallow fair use. It is respectfully submitted
that a correction is needed in the law.
As part of this trend, the first factor has tended to swallow up the second factor (nature of the copyrighted
work a consideration that courts enunciate then largely ignore), as well as the third factor (amount and
substantiality of the copying), since taking an entire work can still be consonant with a transformative
purpose. See generally Beebe, supra note 3 at 588-591 (discussing the "stampeding" of the factors).
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technological forms of dissemination. The first notable breach in the defence concerned a play that had interpolated a famous dialogue from an Abbott and Costello
motion picture. The District Court had found that the play's verbatim incorporation
of the prior work was transformative because the play's overall context was completely different from the copied work. The transformative character of the use in turn
led the court to disregard the film producer's market for licensing extracts from the
film's dialogues. The Second Circuit reversed, criticising the lower court's "flawed"
reasoning that conflated "the general artistic and critical purpose and character of the
Play" with the specific use of the copied dialogue. "The district court did not explain
how defendants' extensive copying of a famous comedy routine was necessary to this
purpose, much less how the character of the Routine was transformed by defendants'
use". 57 The court went on to find the verbatim incorporation non-transformative. In
response to the defendants' contention that the play made a different dramatic use of
the copied content, the court retorted:
The 'dramatic' purpose served by the Routine in the Play appears to be as a
'McGuffin,' that is, as a theatrical device that sets up the plot, but is of little or
no significance in itself. To advance the plot of the play, [the playwright] needed
[the protagonist] to lie about something and for [another character] to call him on
it. But the particular subject of the lie-the Routine-appears irrelevant to that
58
purpose.
Here, the protagonist lied about creating the Abbott and Costello dialogue himself.
But the protagonist could have lied about having created any dialogue; there was
no particular reason that character needed to plagiarise the plaintiff's work. The
court's analysis recalls (but does not cite) its earlier determination in Rogers v Koons,
that if Koons sought to satirise the banality of suburban life, he did not need Art
Rogers' photograph to make that point.59 The court's willingness to engage in literary
analysis, labelling the use of the Routine a "McGuffin", indicates that the Second
Circuit may be greeting assertions of transformative use more sceptically.
The Fourth Circuit took a similarly closer look at the allegedly transformative character of the use in reversing a District Court's determination that the unauthorised
incorporation of a photographic view of Washington D.C.'s Adams Morgan neighbourhood into a website showing D.C. tourist attractions related to a film festival
transformed the purpose of the copied work and therefore was a fair use. 60 The Fourth
Circuit rebuked the District Court's credulous acceptance of the transformative use
defence:
Violent Hues used the Photo expressly for its content-that is, to depict Adams
Morgan-rather than for data organization or historical preservation. Instead,
Violent Hues' sole claim to transformation is that its secondary use of the Photo
provided film festival attendees with 'information' regarding Adams Morgan. But
57
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such a use does not necessarily create a new function or meaning that expands
human thought; if this were so, virtually all illustrative uses of photography would
qualify as transformative. 61
The Fourth Circuit's reproach may help rein in some of the doctrinal sprawl that
"informational" transformative uses have spawned. The informational/aesthetic distinction is problematic, particularly as applied to photographs because photographs
manifest both qualities. All photographs are "informational" in displaying the appearance of their subjects. As original works of authorship, they also are "aesthetic" in
the way they portray their subjects. As Violent Hues (4th Cir) illustrates, distinctions
based on the purpose of the copying-assigning different fair use consequences to
copying in order to communicate the photograph's subject, as opposed to copying in
order to exploit the expressive qualities of the portrayal-makes no sense. Unless the
quality of the copy is so poor as to make the rendition unfit for further communication, "informational" copying will inevitably exploit expression. If "informational"
copying to show what the subject of the photograph looks like were a "transformative" fair use, then most photographs would effectively no longer enjoy copyright
protection.
One District Court has used Cariou as the baseline comparison to query the transformativeness of an appropriation more extensive and less re-manipulated than the
CanalZone images the Second Circuit ruled fair use as a matter of law. In Graham,62
another controversy involving Richard Prince's appropriation of a different photographer's image of a Rastafarian (see images below), the District Court rejected a
motion to dismiss, in an analysis strongly suggesting that a subsequent trial on the
merits would lead to a rejection of the fair use defence.

The court recalled that in Cariou, "[t]he majority stressed the substantial aesthetic
differences between the works, pointing out that Prince 'fundamentally' altered
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62

Supra note 36.

280

Singapore Journalof Legal Studies

[2020 ]

the original photographs' 'composition, presentation, scale, colour palette, and
media'." 63 By contrast, in Graham's case:
[A reasonable] observer must conclude that Prince's Untitled does not so 'heavily obscure and alter' Graham's RastafarianSmoking a Joint that it renders the
original photograph 'barely recognizable.' The primary image in both works is
the photograph itself. Prince has not materially altered [Graham's work].64
In ruling Prince's use not transformative as a matter of law, the court emphasised
that Graham's image, virtually unchanged, constituted almost the entirety of Prince's
work. The court distinguished Koons's Niagara, in which Andrea Blanch's photo
formed part of a much larger and more complex composition:
Koons incorporated the legs from that photograph into a massive collage painting
featuring three other pairs of women's legs, 'dangling prominently over images
of confections,' including trays of pastries and ice-cream, 'with a grassy field and
Niagara Falls in the background'. 65
The court's analysis evokes a variant of the quip "copying from one source is
infringement; copying from multiple sources is research" 66 : appropriating and altering multiple images "transforms" each one; appropriating a single work in toto and
verbatim is not "transformative" as a matter of law.
But the pendulum's return does not follow a continuous arc; these decisions may
not sound the death knell of defendant-deferential assessments of transformativeness
in appropriation art. Courts may continue to apply a capacious concept of transformativeness, endorsing wholesale use of other creators' works as "raw material", perhaps
because judges remain uneasy about second-guessing artistic judgments. The problematic reasoning of Andy Warhol Foundationfor the Visual Arts, Inc v Goldsmith67
underscores the court's reluctance to impose copyright liability on an artist celebrated
for his reworking of other artists' images. There, the declaratory judgment defendant
took a photograph of Prince in 1981 (see below). Vanity Fair licensed the photograph
in 1984 for $400 "for use as an artist's reference in connection with an article to be
published in Vanity Fair Magazine". Vanity Fair commissioned Andy Warhol to create an illustration based on the photograph and it published Warhol's illustration to
accompany an article about Prince in the November 1984 issue of Vanity Fair (see
below). The illustration published in Vanity Fair was one of a series of 16 silkscreen
paintings, prints and drawings Warhol created based on Goldsmith's photograph.
After Prince's death in 2016, Vanity Fair obtained a license from the Andy Warhol
Foundation to republish one of the Warhol images (a different one than the magazine
had printed in 1984) on the cover of a special issue of the magazine devoted to the
63
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Ibid at 378 (citing Cariou, supra note 29 at 706). The court in Graham, ibid, noted that "[t]hese changes
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performer, which appears on the left, below. Vanity Fair did not obtain a license
from Goldsmith, nor did its special issue credit her source photograph, although the
November 1984 issue had included a source credit.

Photo: Lynn Goldsmith

Andy Warhol, Prince (for Vanity Fair)
In concluding on a motion for summary judgment that Warhol's use of Goldsmith's
photograph was fair use, the court held Warhol's use to be transformative. While
Goldsmith portrayed Prince as "not a comfortable person" and a "vulnerable human
being", the Warhol series, according to the court:
[C]an reasonably be perceived... to have transformed Prince from a vulnerable,
uncomfortable person to an iconic, larger-than-life figure. The humanity Prince
embodies in Goldsmith's photograph is gone. Moreover, each Prince Series work
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is immediately recognizable as a 'Warhol' rather than as a photograph of Princein the same way that Warhol's famous representations of Marilyn Monroe and Mao
are recognizable as 'Warhols,' not as realistic photographs of those persons...
[The Warhol series] add[s] something new to the world of art and the public
would be deprived of this contribution if the works could not be distributed. 68
The court appears to be suggesting that the more characteristic and celebrated an
artist's style, the broader his entitlement to adopt others' works. While the Warhol
version may be "immediately recognizable" as an iteration of his brand of representation, it is far from clear that no reasonable jury could find that, despite the
works' "aesthetic differences", Goldsmith's photograph not only remains identifiable in Warhol's version but also that its essence persists. "Transformation" may be
in the beholding; Warhol may have "transformed Prince from a vulnerable, uncomfortable person to an iconic, larger-than-life figure". But it does not follow that the
"icon" symbolises power or self-satisfaction. A reasonable jury might equally well
perceive a heightening of the "humanity" that, for the court, Warholisation drained
from the image.
As in Cariou, the transformative character of the use influenced the court's evaluation of the fourth factor as well, in terms all too reminiscent of the Second Circuit's:
"[i]t is plain that the markets for a Warhol and for a Goldsmith fine-art or other type
of print are different". 69 Like Richard Prince, Warhol's celebrity sells his works,
while Goldsmith shares Cariou's obscurity. The court was similarly dismissive of
Goldsmith's claim that the Warhol prints usurped her licensing market:
Goldsmith's evidence and arguments do not show that the Prince Series works
are market substitutes for her photograph. She provides no reason to conclude
that potential licensees will view Warhol's Prince Series, consisting of stylized
works manifesting a uniquely Warhol aesthetic, as a substitute for her intimate
and realistic photograph of Prince. Although Goldsmith points out that her photographs and Warhol's works have both appeared in magazines and on album
covers, this does not suggest that a magazine or record company would license a
transformative Warhol work in lieu of a realistic Goldsmith photograph. 70
The court did not consider whether the relevant markets include the one of licensing to Warhol himself (and to other artists who would use Goldsmith's work as
"source material"). Rather, the court's analysis suggests that Warhol may permissibly preempt Goldsmith's opportunities to license her work simply by being more
famous and recognisable than she. One might instead inquire, akin to the Second
Circuit in McCollum and in Rogers, if the public wants "a Warhol", must it be a
Warhol of a Goldsmith? 71 The court's approach lends support to the criticism that a
68
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"transformative use" exemption conflicts with the statutory grant of exclusive rights
to make derivative works; the statute defines these as encompassing any "form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted". 72

B. More CriticalAssessments of "Transformativeness" in New Purpose Cases
With respect to new technological uses, recent cases show courts are more critically
examining the transformative character of allegedly repurposed disseminations. In
VHT, Inc v Zillow Group, Inc, 73 the VHT photo service claimed that the Zillow real
estate database had incorporated VHT's photographers' images of home interiors
into Zillow's Digs database to show the interiors of the houses that are on the Zillow
database. Zillow acquired copies of the plaintiff's images, without the photographers'
authorisation, and indexed them in order to allow them to come up on the search for
Digs. Zillow defended the ensuing infringement action on the ground that it was a
search engine, and under Ninth Circuit precedent, copying by search engines was
transformative and therefore fair use.
The District Court disagreed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It emphasised that
"the label 'search engine' is not a talismanic term that serves as an on-off switch as
to fair use". 74 It distinguished prior search engine cases in which the output was a
non-substitutional thumbnail photo; or, as in Google Books, where the output either
contained no expression at all or merely non-substitutional "snippets" which could
not be cumulated into a full page or other quantity that might in some way be substitutional. The court thus recognised that a transformativeness inquiry does not stop
at observing that defendant's use involves a search function; rather, the court must
examine what the search program delivers once it has identified the targeted content.
In the earlier cases, what the program delivered did not substitute for the copied
content. In VHT v Zillow, by contrast, Zillow delivered high-resolution, full-quality
photographs which competed with the plaintiff's licensing of those photographs for
uses that included exactly the kinds of uses Zillow was making: to display the interiors
of homes listed in the database.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis offers a variation on the relationship of transformativeness and competition. Many of the cases we have reviewed derive a finding of
non-substitution from the initial characterisation of the use as transformative (transformative use = transformative, ie, non-competing, market). In VHT v Zillow, the
capacity of Zillow's use to usurp a market for the photographs confirmed the use's
non-transformative character.
A further step along the path of transformative use breaks the equation between
transformativeness and market harm to acknowledge that, even if a use is transformative, it might nonetheless harm the actual or potential markets for the copied
work, and therefore not be "fair". Fox News Network v TVEyes, Inc 75 presented such
72
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an instance. The District Court, and majority and concurring opinions in the Second Circuit also reveal diverging assessments of transformativeness. The defendant
TVEyes was a commercial "media monitoring" service which copied and stored
radio and television news broadcasts in their entirety to enable its subscribers to
retrieve portions of broadcasts that interest them by keyword searches of TVEyes'
database. It can be likened to a digital and visual version of the old "clipping services"
where employees read newspapers to extract all the articles in which their clients'
names appeared. Except that, in this case, it was the client who not only chose the
search themes but also did the extracting thanks to the access that TVEyes' database
afforded to the entire content of radio and television news broadcasts. The video
clips provided by the service in response to search queries generally lasted from two
to ten minutes.
The District Court held that the service was covered by fair use on the ground
that it transformed the purpose of the broadcasts. Like the District Court in Violent
Hues (DC), the analysis in TVEyes (DC) analysis illustrates how far out lower courts
perceived the fair use pendulum to have swung. In the District Court's view, the
video clips were "transformative" because their purpose was to let the researcher
know "what was said" in the television reports, rather than telling viewers "this
is what you should know". 76 Not only is this distinction elusive, but as the Fourth
Circuit warned in Violent Hues (4th Cir), the approach in TVEyes (DC)-"this is what
the copied work said"-may end up converting any work, including its expression,
into a piece of information, thus justifying the copying as "documentary" fair use.
The Second Circuit reversed, but still found the use "somewhat transformative",
not as a documentary use, but because TVEyes "utilizes technology to achieve the
transformative purpose of improving the efficiency of delivering content". 77 The
majority's liberal (not to say profligate) perception of transformativeness provoked
a caustic concurrence from Judge Kaplan (sitting by designation). If the use was
"somewhat transformative" because it enhanced user convenience in viewing the
desired extracts, he charged, then transformative use will inevitably conflict with
copyright owners' exploitation of their works: "[n]ew efficiency-enhancing content
delivery technologies that will seek to distribute copyrighted material owned by
others doubtless now or soon will exist." 7 8
While the majority's willingness to characterise defendant's content-delivery as
"transformative" (albeit "modest at best" 79 ) strains the concept of transformativeness, it is significant that the court rejected the fair use defence notwithstanding a
finding of transformative use. Because the duration of the clips equalled or exceeded
the totality of each extracted news story (factor 3), and because there was a "plausibly exploitable market" for deferred viewing of television content, TVEyes' service
plainly "usurped a function for which Fox is entitled to demand compensation under
a licensing agreement". 80 Transformativeness did not sweep all before it, and the
court trained renewed attention on the third, and particularly, fourth fair use factors.
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Similarly, in CapitolRecords, LLC v ReDigi Inc, 81 concerning an online service
that brokered sales of "used" MP3 files, the Second Circuit recalled its generous characterisation of transformativeness in new purpose cases: "a secondary use may be
transformative if it provides information about the original, 'or expands its utility'."82 As with the (dubiously) transformative purpose of enhancing consumer
access, utility-expansion can encompass a good deal of exploitation, and thus risks
denominating all but the most directly competing uses "transformative". In ReDigi,
the Second Circuit nonetheless found a "total absence (or at least very low degree)
of transformative purpose", 83 because ReDigi "essentially... provide[s] a market
for the resale of digital music files, which resales compete with sales of the same
recorded music by the rights holder". 84 The parenthetical "at least a very low degree"
suggests the court may still seek to discern some shard of transformativeness, but
such strained perceptions do not matter if the court maintains its principal focus
on the economic consequences of the scarcely repurposed use. Because ReDigi's
copying competed directly with sales of the plaintiff's works, the court ruled that the
fourth factor "weighs powerfully against fair use". 85
Judge Leval's opinion in Google Books hypothesises a different instance in which
market impact might outweigh even a highly transformative use, in that case, of
indexing and data mining or snippet-delivery; the opinion also identifies a new kind
of market harm:
If, in the course of making an arguable fair use of a copyrighted work, a secondary
user unreasonably exposed the rights holder to destruction of the value of the
copyright resulting from the public's opportunity to employ the secondary use as
a substitute for purchase of the original (even though this was not the intent of the
secondary user), this might well furnish a substantial rebuttal to the secondary
user's claim of fair use. For this reason, the Arriba Soft and Perfect 10 courts, in
upholding the secondary user's claim of fair use, observed that thumbnail images,
which transformatively provided an Internet pathway to the original images, were
of sufficiently low resolution that they were not usable as effective substitutes for
the originals. 86
The court found that Google had taken "effective measures... to guard against piratical hacking", 87 so that the risk of security failure did not defeat a fair use defence. But,
by negative inference, no matter how "transformative" the use, if its implementation
depends on manipulation of permanently stored copies that are inadequately secured,
then the threat to the copyright owner's market should offset the transformativeness
of the use. If the deployment of effective security assures us that the market for the
work won't be compromised by runaway copies, then ineffective security deprives
81
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us of that assurance, and undermines a fair use defence. Thus, in Google Books, had
the authors rebutted Google's showing, the prospective economic harm from porous
security should have weighted the scales more heavily against fair use even though
full text retention and searchability were necessary to generate the transformative
outputs. As the court acknowledged:
Even if the purpose of the copying is for a valuably transformative purpose, such
copying might nonetheless harm the value of the copyrighted original if done in
a manner that results in widespread revelation of sufficiently significant portions
of the original as to make available a significantly competing substitute. 88
Importantly, the focus on security failures demonstrates that fair use of digital content
is not static: if the subsequent inadequacy of security measures brings prospective
economic harm to the fore, it may render a previously fair use unfair. When the
facts that supported the fair use finding change, so should the legal conclusion. Thus,
for example, advances in hacking should oblige the proprietor of a database containing copyrighted works to update its security, lest a level previously sufficient,
and therefore supportive of fair use, later become inadequate and therefore inconsistent with fair use. Even where the use is "highly transformative", courts should
closely scrutinise the impermeability of a prospective fair user's digital protections.
Google's security may be "impressive", 89 and Google may have every incentive to
maintain it, but not every user capable of scanning and storing in-copyright works
for non-infringing, "transformative" purposes, may have the resources, expertise or
inclination to safeguard the copied content.

C. The Reinvigoration of the Fourth Factor
We have seen that at its apogee, a finding of "transformative use" tended to dictate,
even distort, analysis of the fourth, market harm, factor. The District Court's opinion
in Violent Hues (DC), and its correction by the Fourth Circuit, make the point. The
District Court, having found the use "transformative", then (placing the burden of
proof on the wrong party) ruled that the plaintiff did not show market harm because
he made two sales of the Photo after Violent Hues' use began. 90 The Fourth Circuit
rejoined: "[t]hat cannot be correct. If the mere fact of subsequent sales served to
defeat a claim of market harm, then commercially successful works could hardly
ever satisfy this factor." 91
If courts less readily find transformative use, one might expect them to focus
more rigorously on market harm. In fact, however, a more critical examination of "transformativeness" under the first factor may nonetheless still lead to
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"stampeding" 92 the other factors, but in the opposite direction: if the use was commercial and not transformative, courts apply a presumption of market harm.9 3 Calling
it a "presumption", however, is misleading, since presumptions are burden-shifting
devices, and the defendant already bears the burden of making out the affirmative
defence of fair use. 94 More likely, one should understand the label "presumption"
here to mean that the defendant may not be likely to meet its burden, since courts
tend to perceive non-transformative uses as substitutional. 95 In other words, "transformativeness" may remain decisive, but the equation has flipped. The formula "if
transformative work/purpose, then no market harm" meets its corollary: "[i]f commercial and not transformative, then market harm." Thus, fair use continues to reduce
to a one-factor test, but one that cuts both ways.
Fortunately, the fair use calculus is not always so simplistic. Some case law
indicates that defendants may nonetheless escape the flip side of the transformativeness coin. For example, a defendant might show that the non-transformative
use at issue does not usurp any relevant markets because, even if the market exists
in the abstract, neither the plaintiff nor similarly situated copyright owners have
exploited those markets. The ongoing litigation between Georgia State University
and Cambridge University Press and other academic book publishers over electronic
"course reserves" (essentially, the technological successor to photocopied coursepacks) rings several changes on the theme of cognisable market harm where the use
is non-transformative (albeit also noncommercial). Initially, the District Court had
ruled that the publishers' failure to license excerpts of books for enrolled students'
online consultation through the university library would weigh the fair use finding
against the publishers.
In effect, the court made fair use contingent on a license-it-or-lose-it standard. 96
The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, criticising the District Court's methodology,
but did not substantially disagree with the significance the District Court accorded
the absence of a licensing program for some of the plaintiffs' works. 97
On remand, the District Court concluded that even as to books for which the
publishers had offered licenses for digital access, factor four nonetheless favoured
the university in most instances because the publishers had earned only trivial income
from licensing electronic course copying of the work at issue, and therefore the
cumulative impact remained too small to weigh the fourth factor in the publishers'
favour.98 The Eleventh Circuit again vacated in part, ruling that the District Court

92
93

94
95
96
97
98

See Beebe, supra note 3; see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
TrademarkInfringement, (2006) 94 Cal L Rev 1581, at 1614, 1615.
See eg, Campbell, supra note 60; Violent Hues (4th Cir), supra note 93 at 268; Disney Enterprises, Inc
v VidAngel, Inc, 869 F 3d 848 at 861 (9 th Cir 2017) [VidAngel]: "[b]ecause the district court concluded
that VidAngel's use was commercial and not transformative, it was not error to presume likely market
harm".
See the above discussion of Perfect 10 (original) and Perfect 10 (amended), supra notes 40-44. See also
Campbell, supra note 4 at 590; Google Books, supra note 6 at 213.
See eg, Violent Hues (4th Cir), supra note 60; VidAngel, supra note 93.
See Cambridge Univ Press v Becker, 863 F Supp 2d 1190 (ND Ga 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
(sub nom Patton, supra note 34).
Ibid at 1277.
Cambridge Univ Press v Becker, 371 F Supp 3d 1218 (ND Ga 2016), aff'd in part, vacated in part (sub
nom CambridgeUniv Press v Albert, 906 F 3d 1290 (11th Cir 2018) [Albert]).
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should have retained its original finding of market harm as to the works for which
the publishers had offered licenses. 99
An extant licensing program therefore may establish that the same use, unlicensed,
will cause economic harm; one should not, however, immediately make the negative
inference of absence of cognisable harm when the plaintiff declines to license the
use that the defendant is exploiting. The plaintiff may have economic reasons to
forego a particular market, as the Eleventh Circuit recognised in its first decision in
Cambridge University Press:
Of course, it need not always be true that a publisher's decision not to make a
work available for digital permissions conclusively establishes that the publisher
envisioned little or no demand, and that the value of the permissions market is
zero. After all, a number of other factors might influence a publisher's distribution
decision: the publisher may not yet have figured out how to sell work in a different medium, or it might want to restrict circulation in one medium to promote
another.100
In addition, an author might also decline to exploit a particular market, for example,
for sequels 10 1 or other spin-offs, 102 because she seeks to preserve her artistic vision
for the work. The Second Circuit has recognised that:
It would... not serve the ends of the Copyright Act-i.e., to advance the arts-if
artists were denied their monopoly over derivative versions of their creative works
merely because they made the artistic decision not to saturate those markets with
variations of their original. 103
Renewed emphasis on the fourth factor may prompt courts to question the nature and
viability of the plaintiff's market for her work. For example, in Cambridge University Press, the District Court considered the publishers' licensing market too trivial
to amount to cognisable harm. 104 The Eleventh Circuit reversed on that ground,
but the denigration of the plaintiff's licensing markets in Cariou and Goldstein suggests that the approach may remain available elsewhere, and might tempt courts
5
in other circuits to discount the worth of those markets. In Philpot v WOS, Inc, 10
99 Albert, ibid.
100 Patton, supra note 34 at 1277.
101 Cf Salinger, supra note 27 (JD Salinger did not authorise sequels to The Catcher in the Rye, supra
note 27).
102 Cf Castle Rock Ent, Inc v Carol Pub Group, Inc, 150 F 3d 132 (2d Cir 1998) (Jerry Seinfeld declined
to license trivia quiz book about Seinfeld television show).
103 Ibid at 146. The court found the quiz book's use of the Seinfeld shows non-transformative because the
purpose of the quiz book was not to educate, analyse, criticize or comment, but rather to repackage the
Seinfeld programs to entertain the reader and to "satiate Seinfeld fans' passion" for the show. Ibid at
142, 143.
104 The focus on whether and how successfully the copyright owner has exploited the work risks initiating
a race to the market, particularly for new technological modes of exploitation. When a new market is
developing, the copyright owner may be deriving little or nothing from participating in that market, or
may find itself catching up with more technologically adept copiers.
105 No 18-CV-339-RP, 2019 WL 1767208 (WD Tex 22 April 2019) [Philpot].
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a District Court in the Fifth Circuit weighed the fourth factor against a photographer
who made his images of musical concert performers available for free, subject to
Creative Commons attribution licenses. The plaintiff earned almost no money from
his photographs, but often was paid in kind, with concert tickets, drinks and food.
The defendant's online celebrity news site incorporated two of the plaintiff's photos,
which it had downloaded from third party sites, unchanged and without attribution.
The defendant sought summary judgment, urging fair use. The court stated that the
issue of transformativeness could not be determined on summary judgment, but concluded on the record before it that the fourth factor favoured the defendant because
he made his photographs available for free, losing money annually. The plaintiff
contested the characterisation of the market for his work, to no avail:
Philpot responds that his photographs are not offered for free; they are offered
for the price of attribution, which has economic value as advertising for his
work.... [T]his factor looks at the market for the original work and derivatives
from that work, not at the market for the plaintiff's work in general. Although the
Court accepts that attribution might lead someone to purchase one of Philpot's
works, he fails to explain how any amount of advertisement might lead to being
paid for two works that he makes available for free. 10 6
The court's perception of the plaintiff as a copyright troll ("the principal way that
Philpot appears to make money from his photography is settlement agreements in
copyright lawsuits" 107 ) may have obscured an important issue regarding the kind of
harm cognisable under the fourth factor. Suppose an author, subject to attribution,
makes some of her work available for free as a "draw" for other works, or indeed
for services not necessarily involving the creation of works of authorship. Copying
the "free" work may not diminish its market because the author has effectively
relinquished any claim to compensation for that work. But in asserting that the
fourth "factor looks at the market for the original work and derivatives from that
work, not at the market for the plaintiff's work in general" [emphasis added], the
court may be undermining "loss leader" business models of this kind.
The statute, however, does not require a court to constrain its conception of
cognisable harm to the market for the copied work. Factor four requires courts to
assess "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work". 10 8 "Value of" ranges more broadly than "market for" (indeed, reading the
two synonymously would violate the principle that words in a statute are to be given
independent meaning 109 ). Unattributed copying of a work deprives it of its value as
a "draw" for other works (or services).
106
107

Ibid at
Ibid.

*7.

108 17 USC § 107(4) [emphasis added].
109 See eg, Quality King Distributorsv L'anza Research Int'l, Inc, 523 US 135 at 145-48 (1998) (Supreme
Court considering whether one potential interpretation of the 17 USC, supra note 1, would render one
of its provisions superfluous). See also Michael J Madison, "A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use"
(2004) 45 Wm & Mary L Rev 1525 at 1562: "[w]hat should we make of the disjunctive 'potential market
for or value' of the work? 'Market' and 'value' might be the same thing, but the linguistic distinction
appears purposive".
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D. Reforming FairUse: The "Value" of the Copyrighted Work
Very little case law or secondary authority specifically confront the contention that
the "value of the copyrighted work" should mean something not synonymous with
markets for the copyrighted work. 110 The most pertinent authority may be Video
Pipeline, Inc v Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc,I 1 which ruled that a defendant
who copied and compiled film trailers was not likely to succeed on the merits of its
fair use defence when the copyright owner introduced evidence of its movie trailers'
advertising value, including for other works:
Video Pipeline takes too narrow a view of the harm contemplated by this fourth
factor. The statute directs us to consider "the effect of the use upon the...value of
the copyrighted work," not only the effect upon the "market," however narrowly
that term is defined. And the value "need not be limited to monetary rewards;
compensation may take a variety of forms."... Disney introduced evidence that
it has entered an agreement to cross-link its trailers with the Apple Computer
home page and that it uses on its own websites "the draw of the availabilityof
authentic trailersto advertise, cross-marketand cross-sell otherproducts, and to
obtain valuable marketing informationfrom visitors who chose [sic] to register
at the site or make a purchase there."... In light of Video Pipeline's commercial
use of the clip previews and Disney's use of its trailers as described by the record
evidence, we easily conclude that there is a sufficient market for, or other value
in, movie previews such that the use of an infringing work could have a harmful
effect cognizable under the fourth factor. 112
Thus, unlike the District Court in Philpot, the Third Circuit accepts that the relevant "value" need not lie solely in the sales of the copied work; when the copying
undermines the ability of that work to serve as a "draw" for other works or economic
benefits, it has deleteriously impacted the "value of the copyrighted work".
Moreover, the "value" of the work need not be monetary.11 3 Indeed, the "linguistic
disjunction"1 1 4 between "potential market for" and "value of" the copyrighted work
permits an inference that the relevant value may encompass other kinds of authorial
concerns. For example, in Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v Substance,
Inc, 115 the Seventh Circuit held the disclosure of secure test questions was not a fair
use. The District Court had emphasised the unauthorised publication's harm to the

110 See Madison, ibid at 10. Madison notes the "purposive" "linguistic disjunction" between "market"
and "value", but does not explore what independent meaning "value of the copyrighted work" might
have.
"
342 F 3d 191 (3d Cir 2003) [Video Pipeline], abrogated on other grounds by TD Bank NA v Hill, 928 F
3d 259 (3d Cir 2019).
112 Video Pipeline, ibid at 202 [emphasis added], citing Worldwide Church of God v PhiladelphiaChurch
of God, Inc, 227 F 3d 1110 at 1119 (9th Cir 2000).
113 See eg, Soc'y of Holy TransfigurationMonastery, Inc v Gregory, 689 F 3d 29 at 64 (1st Cir 2012): ("the
fourth factor of the fair use inquiry cannot be reduced to strictly monetary terms").
114 See Madison, supra note 109.

115 79 F Supp 2d 919 (ND Ill 2000), aff'd 354 F 3d 624 (7th Cir 2003).
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tests' educational value 116 and Judge Posner agreed: "[Defendant] is destroying the
value of the tests and the fact that it's not a market value has no significance once
the right to copyright unpublished works is conceded, as it must be".1 1 7
A work's "value" may also be reputational, but the author will not reap economic
or moral benefits unless the public identifies the work with its author. Authorship
attribution has not typically featured in the fair use inquiry, perhaps because in
most cases, the copied work's author either is generally known (as is usually the
case in parodies), or has been credited (as in scholarly commentary). But increasingly, digital uses, such as that at issue in Philpot, sever the work from its author's
name. When the currency in which the author trades is reputational rather than
directly monetary, unattributed copying, even-or especially-from copies made
available for free, will have a deleterious impact upon the value of the copyrighted
work. 118
Treating the use's impact on the copied work's value as an inquiry distinct from
assessing harm to the copied work's potential market allows the fair use doctrine to
consider additional interests relevant to authorship incentives and consumer information. Were factor four confined to the economic prospects for the copied work, then
copyright doctrine might discourage the development of means of making works
available that are not based on selling copies of or access to the copied work. Loss
leader business models-similar to those employed by the band The Grateful Deadallow copying or accessing the copyrighted work without direct charge. But they
anticipate that the consumer attracted by the free content will purchase or subscribe
to other works or goods or services, or simply will remain on the copyright owner's
site long enough to be exposed to advertisements. 119 The "value of" the copyrighted
work inheres in the viability of these business models, but inquiring only about
harm to the potential market for the copied work overlooks the broader economic
calculus. Similarly, a reading of factor four that bypasses the "value of" the copied
work ignores moral and reputational interests which may not directly implicate the
economic returns from the copied work, but which underpin the author's incentives
to create.

116 Ibid at 933, 934:

Defendants' publication of the tests significantly decreased that value, and the court need not
determine at this time the monetary damage Defendants caused. The court finds no difference
between a copyright holder losing future profits because of a copyright infringement and the Board
losing its future educational value of its copyrighted work.
117 354 F 3d at 627 [emphasis added].
118 See eg, Weissmann v Freeman, 868 F 2d 1313 at 1326 (2d Cir 1989) [Weissmann]: "[t]he rewards
that Congress planned for copyright holders of scientific works to reap arguably include promotion and
advancement in academia.. .In scholarly circles... recognition of one's scientific achievements is a vital
part of one's professional life." [emphasis added]; Greaver v National Ass'n of Corporate Directors,
No. C.A. 94-2127(WBB), 1997 WL 34605245 (DDC 19 Nov 1997): "[i]n the 'consulting world,' as in
other fields such as academia where 'profit is ill-measured in dollars,'... recognition as an authoritative
voice is the measure of the value of one's work", quoting Weissmann at 1324 [emphasis added].
119 David M Scott & Brian H alligan, Marketing Lessons from The Grateful Dead: What Every Business
Can Learn from the Most Iconic Band in History (New Jersey: Wiley, 2010) at xx-xxi. See also
Jared Lindzon, "The Grateful Dead as Business Pioneers" (23 March 2016) Fortune, online: Fortune
<https://fortune.com/2016/03/23/grateful-dead-business-lessons/>.

292

Singapore Journalof Legal Studies

IV.

[2020 ]

OBJECT LESSONS?

In summary, if "transformativeness" (or its absence) no longer foreordains fair use
outcomes, and courts attend more closely to the impact of the use (transformative
or not) on the market for or the value of the work, they will need to enrich their
appreciation of that factor. Courts should adopt a broad understanding of substitution
effects to cover actual and potential derivative markets: the relevant referent may
not be markets that the plaintiff is exploiting, but markets that similarly situated
copyright owners might exploit. Failure to license secondary uses may not betoken
the insignificance of a market the copyright owner foregoes (and therefore, under
license-it-or-lose-it, open to third-party exploitation), but rather a strategic or artistic
decision not to exploit.
Similarly, the "value" of a work should be understood to encompass not only
the monetisation of that work, but also the role the work plays in the broader economic or artistic agenda of its creator. Specifically, failure to attribute authorship
presumptively compromises the value of the work, and should weigh heavily against
a finding of fair use. It is all the more important in jurisdictions like the US and
Singapore, which-despite international obligations 12 0-lack general provisions on
moral rights, to take authorship attribution into account in evaluating fair use. (I note
that the fair dealing provisions in sections 35 and 109 of the Singapore Copyright
Act 12 1 do not include an obligation of "sufficient acknowledgement" of source and
authorship. But they do instruct courts to address "the effect of the dealing upon the
potential market for, or value of, the work". Of course, a true, affirmative, attribution
122
right would be better still, and I understand that may be in prospect in Singapore,
albeit, alas, not currently in the US.)
What other lessons might jurisdictions seeking to adopt or expand a fair use
exception draw from the saga of transformative use in the US? 123 Judge Pierre Leval,
whose 1990 law review article coined the term "transformative use", has cautioned
that:
The word 'transformative' cannot be taken too literally as a sufficient key to
understanding the elements of fair use. It is rather a suggestive symbol for a
complex thought, and does not mean that any and all changes made to an author's
original text will necessarily support a finding of fair use. 124
But, as the Google Books decision in which he offered that disclaimer reveals, making
no changes to an author's original text may nonetheless qualify as "transformative"
fair use. Such statements and outcomes might well befuddle non-US lawyers (or for
that matter, many US lawyers). Moreover, US case law suggests that too often the
120 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, 828 UNTS
221 art 6bis (minimum protections include authors' rights of attribution and integrity).
121 (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed Sing) [SG CopyrightAct].
122 See Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, Singapore Copyright Review Report 19-21 (17
January 2019), Proposal 4 (to introduce a right of attribution), online: Ministry of Law
<https://app.mlaw.govsg/news/press-releases/singapore-copyright-review-report-2019>.
123 For a review of adoption of fair use or fair use-inspired exceptions outside the US, see Peter Yu, "Fair
Use and its Global Paradigm Evolution" [2019] U Ill L Rev 111.
124 Google Books, supra note 6 at 214.
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label does not symbolise a "complex thought", but rather implements a simplistic
conclusion. Perhaps, as the Seventh Circuit has acerbically recommended, one should
stick to the statutory language, particularly the fourth factor, and cease trying to label
uses as "transformative" or not. 125
Other countries' lawyers and judges, not immersed in the ebb and flow of US fair
use decisions, might find that our caselaw resists coherent synthesis. Arguably, it is
difficult to ascertain the outliers from the dominant direction. Or, put another way,
depending on one's critique of or aspiration for the copyright system, one observer's
outlier is another's foundational ruling.
Nonetheless, it may be possible to discern some coherence in the morass of
transformative use decisions. I cannot claim credit for these guideposts: authorship
attribution goes to a great copyright litigator, Dale Cendali, of Kirkland and Ellis,
New York. With respect to allegedly transformative works, she inquires whether the
defendant "took too much, and did too little" with the copied material. 126 Examining the amount of the copying (factor 3) in light of how the allegedly transformative
work treats the copied material (factor 1) should help determine the substitution
effect (factor 4) of the portion taken. McCollum and Graham illustrate the application of this principle. 127 Of course, room for disagreement remains in determining
both how much copying is "too much" relative to the new meaning or message the
defendant seeks to convey, and how small an increment of the defendant's additional
authorship is "too little". As a result, these criteria may seem like subjective value
judgments, but in fact the inquiry recalls one of the principal elements of the Berne
Convention Article 10 quotation right: the "extent" of permitted quotations may "not
exceed that justified by the purpose". Moreover, these criteria are consistent with
prior caselaw inquiring whether the defendant went beyond the copying necessary
to support the defendant's arguments or critique, but rather made the defendant's
work more "lively and entertaining". 128 Similarly, in the same decision in which
the Supreme Court adopted "transformative use", it also cautioned against copying to "avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh" or "merely... to get
attention".

12 9

With respect to transformative purposes (when the defendant has not created a
new work that builds on its predecessor), Cendali urges courts to distinguish between
"finding" and "delivering". 130 Copying to enable searching or identifying works is
one thing, but the fairness of the use should turn on what the use delivers. If the output

125 Kienitz, supra note 33 at 758.
126 Warner Bros Ent Inc v RDR Books, 575 F Supp 2d 513 (SDNY 2008) (No 07-CV-9667), 2008 WL
2062743. See the Plaintiff Warner Bros Entertainment, Inc, and J K Rowling's Opening Statement at
27. The court there found that the purpose of the HarryPotter Lexicon's excerpts from the Harry Potter
books was "not consistently transformative" and that the defendant copied more than it needed to for
its transformative purposes.
127 Ibid.
128 Craft, supra note 36 at 129: "Kobler's takings are far too numerous and with too little instructional justification to support the conclusion of fair use.... Stravinsky's colourful epigrams animate the narrative.
I think Kobler might agree that they are the liveliest and most entertaining part of the biography."
129 Campbell, supra note 4 at 580.
130 See the attached Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Fox News Network, LLC's Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment in TVEyes (DC), supra note 75, No 1:13-cv-05315-AKH, 2015 WL
4656263, Document No 134 at 1.
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provides access to substantial and unaltered portions of copyrighted expression, the
delivery is not fair use. If the output discloses no copyrighted expression, or only
non-substitutional amounts of it, then the delivery may be deemed a fair use. The
find/deliver distinction explains the different outcomes in iParadigms, HathiTrust
and Google Books on the one hand, and VHT v Zillow and TVEyes, on the other.
The distinction also can describe the sole (so far) decision of the Singaporean
courts applying Singapore's fair use-like fair dealing provision, 131 Global Yellow
Pages Ltd v PromediaDirectoriesPte Ltd. 132 There, adverting to several US "transformative use" cases, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that copying from a prior
telephone directory was fair dealing when "in essence, what was copied by Promedia
was the data in GYP's directories. There is no evidence, however, that such data as
was copied was then reproduced in the sameform in which it had appeared in GYP's
directories". 133 Similarly:
[E]ven though the scanning and photocopying took place in a commercial setting,
the purpose of the dealing in this case was to access the data that was contained
in the listings, and had nothing to do with the use of the particular arrangement
of that data, which is what attracted copyright in the first place. 134
Thus, the defendant's search engine may have "found" all of the plaintiff's listings,
but what the defendant "delivered" in its rival directories did not reproduce the
copyrightable expression from those listings.
The Singapore Court of Appeal's decision is fully consistent with pretransformative use US fair use case law upholding the intermediate copying of
videogame code in order to produce functionally equivalent or compatible games
that did not copy the code's expressive elements. 135 Ironically, these cases involved
neither a transformative purpose (since the objective was to compete with the copied
work) nor the creation of a new work that transformed the copied work's expression
(since the new output copied no expression). My NYU colleague, Diane Zimmerman, casting a jaundiced eye on "transformative use", once quipped, "the more
things change, the less they seem transformed". 136 I hope this lecture has shown that
while fair use may require reform-including from the predations of "transformative
use"-it need not be "transformed".

131 SG CopyrightAct, supra note 121, s 35.
132 [2017] 2 SLR 185 (CA).
133 Ibid at para 9 [emphasis in original].
134 Ibid at para 88.
135 See eg, Sega Enters Ltd v Accolade, Inc, 977 F 2d 1510 at 1520-27 (9th Cir 1992).
136 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, "The More Things Change, The Less They Seem Transformed: Some
Reflections on Fair Use" (1998) 46 J Copyright Soc USA 251.

